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SYMPOSIUM ADDRESS
RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE 1980's
Jumus L. CHAMBERS*
I want to talk to you about three things this evening. I will be
brief. The first hardly needs to be mentioned: we are facing some
very difficult times today. Reverend Chavis has talked about a
number of these struggles.' I will comment on them from a legal
perspective. The second point is that, as we face these challenges
today, we are in a difficult position because of the lack of commit-
ment among lawyers, the lack of legal talent, and the lack of re-
sources among lawyers willing to respond. The third is that we
* Julius LeVonne Chambers is the Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Mr. Chambers received a B.A. (summa cum
laude) from North Carolina College (now North Carolina Central University), a
M.A. from the University of Michigan, and a J.D. from the University of North
Carolina School of Law where he was first in his class and editor-in-chief of the
Law Review. He also received a LL.M from Columbia University School of Law.
Prior to his appointment as Director-Counsel, Mr. Chambers was the principal
partner in the firm of Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Fuller, P.A.,
in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Anne T. Dowling of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
and Paul C. Ridgeway of Campbell University School of Law provided research
assistance for this article. The text of this article is derived from an address given
at the John J. Broderick Civil Rights Symposium. The symposium was presented
by the Campbell University Law Students Civil Rights Research Council on April
3, 1985.
1. Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Director of the United Church of Christ Commission
on Racial Justice, spoke on the need for viewing the criminal justice system in
terms of widespread social transformations. "[The criminal justice system's] fun-
damental purpose is to assist, in a very specific and restrictive way, the mainte-
nance of the status quo. Therefore I believe that we cannot talk about change,
reform or transformation, without at the same time becoming involved in the so-
cial transformation itself." Dr. Chavis detailed racial disparity within prison sys-
tems, inadequate legal counsel for the poor of all races, the increasing frequency
of racially related violence, and United States policies in South Africa. In con-
cluding, Dr. Chavis said: "Peace is not the answer for war, peace is the presence of
justice. Our nation spends too much of its vast resources in preparing for war, and
too little on the pursuit of justice.. .. We must lift this burden from our shoul-
ders together, hand in hand."
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must see our task as the civil rights lawyers of the late 1930's and
1940's did when they looked for ways to overcome Plessy v. Fergu-
son.2 We face a somewhat different challenge today; but, with the
same determination and commitment that those lawyers had in the
thirties and forties, it is possible for us to respond as successfully
in the 1980's as they did. It is extremely important that, as we
undertake today's challenge, we preserve the process and the sub-
stantive rights that we have achieved in the past.
I was asked in April of 1984 if I would consider leaving North
Carolina to work with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New
York.3 I had worked with a firm in North Carolina for over twenty
years.4 I was raised in North Carolina. It is my home. I will always
love this state and its people. It was a hard decision, but as I re-
flected on what was developing in the country, on the resources
available to respond to these developments, I thought it would be a
truly demanding challenge-one I could not pass up. So I
accepted.
Today, when I learned about the death of a very dear
friend-Kelly Alexander, Sr.5 -I recalled that decision and began
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy, who claimed to be seven-eighths caucasian and
one-eighth African, was arrested for riding in a "white only" train coach in viola-
tion of a Louisiana statute. Plessy argued that the conviction and the establish-
ment of racial categories violated his 14th amendment equal protection rights.
The State argued that while Plessy was excluded from the white coach, by
the same token whites were excluded from the black coach. The coaches, the
State argued, were identical in every respect.
The Supreme Court accepted the State's argument. Justice Brown, for the
majority, held that "no doubt the law had been passed in good faith and for the
promotion of the public good, rather than for the oppression of or injury to any
group of citizens." Thus, the United States entered the twentieth century offi-
cially sanctioning the "separate but equal doctrine."
Only Justice Harlan dissented to the Plessy holding: "But in the view of the
Constitution, in the eyes of the law, there is in the country no superior, dominant,
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color blind."
Id. at 559, (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. Since its establishment in 1940, the LDF has been a significant partner in
the struggle for equal justice. Under the direction of Thurgood Marshall (1940-
1961), Jack Greenberg (1961-1984), and now, Julius Chambers, the LDF has pro-
vided free legal assistance to those seeking equality in education, voting, employ-
ment, housing, health care and the administration of justice.
4. Chambers, Ferguson, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Fuller, of Charlotte.
5. Kelly Alexander, known as "a pioneer of the modern phase of the civil
rights movement in the South," served as the head of the North Carolina chapter
of the NAACP for thirty-six years. He was a member of the NAACP national
board of directors from 1950 until his death, serving as vice chairman in 1983 and
[Vol. 8:29
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to remember the problems we faced several years ago when I first
met Kelly.
I was a freshman as North Carolina Central-North Carolina
College, at that time-and I was on the way home on a bus to a
metropolis in Montgomery County that is about an hour and a half
ride from here. If you have not traveled very much, you have not
heard of this place. It is Mt. Gilead, my home town. I had paid my
dollar and ten cents to ride from Durham to Mt. Gilead on a Trail-
ways Bus. I sat down somewhere in the middle of the bus. When
we got to Carthage, some white people got on the bus and the
driver told me to move to the back. I insisted on staying where I
was, and the driver insisted on my getting off the bus.
Well, I got off the bus in Carthage, about forty miles from my
home, and I called Kelly Alexander. I told him that the bus driver
wanted me to move to the back of the bus, but that I would not
move. I stood up for my rights. Kelly said that was the right thing
to do. "Well, Kelly," I said, "the only problem is, I don't have
enough money to get home."
He worked out a way for me to get to Mt. Gilead. From that
day until his death, I learned a lot from Kelly Alexander-about
the patience that is needed in addressing these problems, the de-
termination that is required, the skill that is necessary, and the
commitment that must come from all of us. Because of that lesson,
I am proud of that experience and will always cherish it.
Let us look at what we are dealing with today. Two months
ago, we were advised that the United States Department of Justice
was beginning to review-or would soon announce its position re-
garding-some existing cases that included provisions on affirma-
tive action. We were told that the Department was examining
three hundred and fifty cases. We began efforts to find out which
ones were under review. We were refused the information. Later
we learned that the Department had identified forty-six cases in-
volving affirmative action plans that it argued were in violation of
the Constitution, and that the Department was writing to the rele-
vant jurisdictions stating that they must reconsider and modify
those plans. Again, we asked for the names of those forty-six juris-
dictions, as well as any others that were being reviewed; again, we
were rebuffed. We filed a lawsuit to get the information under the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.6 Last week, we were
national chairman in 1984. Kelly Alexander died on April 3, 1985.
6. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 612 F.
19851
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advised that we were entitled to the information and were given
the forty-six names. Today, the Department of Justice publicly an-
nounced the names of the forty-six jurisdictions involved.
One of the cases involves the State Highway Patrol of North
Carolina. The Department contends that the consent decree in
that case, which began as Johnson v. The North Carolina State
Highway Patrol,8 in some way violates the constitutional rights of
white members of the highway patrol; the Department has re-
quested that the State agree to modifications of that consent
decree.
At the same time, the Department has begun an attack on ex-
isting minority set-aside programs,9 contending that they also vio-
late the constitutional rights of white citizens. The Department as-
serts that affirmative action in minority set-aside programs cannot
be instituted unless an established constitutional violation of an
identified victim is being remedied. The Department is using the
Supreme Court's decision in Memphis Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts0 as the basis for these actions and is now pro-
Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985).
7. Johnson v. The N.C. State Highway Patrol, Civ. Action No. 74-0349-CIV-5
(M.D.N.C. filed Dec. 9, 1974).
8. The consent decree, reached December 16, 1980, established several af-
firmative requirements regarding the hiring and promotion policies of the High-
way Patrol. Included in these requirements are the hiring of a full-time recruiter
who is a minority member and eight back-up minority recruiters, recruiting ef-
forts at predominantly minority and female colleges and universities, providing
that 50% of the openings in each Patrol Basic School be made available to quali-
fied black applicants and 25% to female applicants, written examinations valid
under Title VII testing guidelines, and promotion policies consistent with length
of service and screenings consistent with Title VII guidelines.
9. The "minority business enterprise" provision of the Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701 et seq. requires that, absent administra-
tive waiver, at least 10% of federal funds granted for local public works projects
be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from busi-
nesses owned by minority group members. Id. at § 6705(f)(2). See also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), holding that the 10% minority set-aside provision
was plainly constitutional, the racial classifications being substantially related to
the achievement of the important and congressionally articulated goal of remedy-
ing the present effects of past racial discrimination. Id. at 482.
10. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). In Stotts, black plaintiffs and the Fire Depart-
ment had entered a consent decree for the stated purpose of remedying the De-
partment's hiring and promotion practices with respect to blacks. Without admit-
ting discrimination, the consent decree established an interim hiring goal of filling
50% of the Department's job vacancies with qualified blacks, and it attempted to
ensure that 20% of the promotions in each job category be given to blacks. The
[Vol. 8:29
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ceeding at a break-neck pace to challenge affirmative action across-
the-board.
But, let me make another point about the North Carolina
Highway Patrol case. I brought that case eleven years ago." At the
time, very few blacks worked as highway patrolmen, and no black
highway patrolman had ever advanced beyond an entry level job.
consent decree contained no provision for layoffs, but by virtue of an earlier con-
sent decree, seniority was to be computed, for the purposes of promotion, trans-
fer, and assignment, "as the total seniority of that person with the City."
Financial troubles ensued for the City, and it had to lay off many employees.
Layoffs were to be based on the "last hired, first fired" rule, pursuant to the se-
niority system. If a senior employee's position were eliminated, he could "bump
down" to a lower ranking position. Because these layoffs would adversely affect
blacks, the district court enjoined this layoff plan "insofar as it will decrease the
percentages of black" employees. Thus, some non-minority employees with more
seniority than minority employees were laid off or demoted.
The Supreme Court held that the injunction was improper and could not be
justified as an effort to either modify or enforce the consent decree. The court
could not order the violation of a bona fide seniority system because § 703(h) of
Title VII "permits the routine application of a seniority system absent proof of an
intention to discriminate." 104 S. Ct. 2587 citing International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977). "If the individual members," the
Court held, "of a plaintiff class demonstrate that they have been actual victims of
the discriminatory practice, they may be awarded competitive seniority and given
their rightful place on the seniority roster." However, "mere membership in the
disadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority award; each individual
must prove that the discriminatory practice had an impact on him." Here, there
was no finding that any of the blacks protected from layoff had been a victim of
discrimination giving rise to the consent decree, and none had received an award
of competitive seniority. Nor had the parties in formulating the consent decree
purported to identify any specific employee entitled to particular relief other than
those listed in the original 1980 decree. Thus, the Court concluded, the court of
appeals had imposed on the parties something that could not have been ordered
had the case gone to trial and the plaintiff there proved that a pattern or practice
of discrimination existed.
The broad language of the Stotts opinion has provided impetus for federal
agencies charged with enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to validate heretofore
unofficial policies. Both the Justice Department and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission have since adopted the precise "mere membership" lan-
guage of the Stotts decision as a statement of their policies. See, e.g. United
States Department of Justice, Legal Activities, 18-9 (1984-85); Statement of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, July 11, 1984. Professor Thomas Mc-
Coy of Vanderbilt University Law School sees Stotts as the "first piece in the
puzzle. These changes at the Supreme Court and the Cabinet level will eventually
be seen as the first pieces in the dismantling of affirmative action." Assault on
Affirmative Action, TmE (p. 19-20, Feb. 25, 1985).
11. See supra note 7-8.
1985]
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They were excluded through the use of tests, through the use of
"character investigations," or through the discretion allowed offi-
cials in selecting individuals for promotion.
Were blacks excluded because of lack of qualifications? Or was
it race that kept blacks from getting jobs with the highway patrol?
Was it race that prevented blacks from being promoted to ser-
geant? The record in the case and the record in North Carolina
show that black people have been systematically excluded from the
highway patrol simply because of their race.12 There is no way to
deny it. Do you know there are no black commanders in the high-
way patrol? If hiring and promotion are based on qualifications,
why is it farfetched to assume that a black person can head the
highway patrol?
So, when you hear the Department of Justice argue that af-
firmative action is wrong and that race-conscious remedies are
wrong, do not be fooled into believing that the Department is do-
ing so because it is interested in a racially-neutral Constitution or
racially-neutral constitutional application of practices by the
states. What the Department is interested in when it seeks to turn
back the limited progress blacks have made in this state and this
country is politics.
Look at other situations. Look at the administration of crimi-
nal law in this country. When I first started practicing law, we did
not have a black judge anywhere in the state; we did not even
think about it. We did not have a black district attorney anywhere
in this state-and did not even think about it. We had a few blacks
occasionally serve on juries-usually through some mistake. Blacks
were not part of the system of criminal justice. Why were they ex-
cluded? Was it because of race? The only way we got black judges
was through insisting that race-past discrimination-be consid-
ered.13 It was race-conscious remedies that put blacks on juries.14
12. At the time Johnson was filed, there were 1110 Highway Patrol uni-
formed personnel. Of these, 29 were black, 4 were Indian, and 1 was Hispanic.
There were no females. All of the minority employees remained at the lowest
rank, the trooper. By Aug. 13, 1979, there were 40 black personnel, with two hav-
ing advanced to the second-lowest rank, sergeant. The first black was hired by the
Highway Patrol in 1967, the second and third in 1969. From 1965 to 1979, the
Patrol hired 1127 white males, 3 white females, 49 black males, 15 Indian males,
and 1 Hispanic male.
13. While serving as a judge of the U.S. District Court (E.D. Pa.), United
States Court of Appeals (3rd Cir.) Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., addressed
the historical background of black jurists:
[Vol. 8:29
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Anyone looking at the under-representation of blacks on juries
could not help but find that constitutional violations were exclud-
ing them. How can anyone believe that there is no longer a need
for race-conscious remedies? The only way we are going to get
blacks fairly represented in the judicial system in this state, with
its history of past discrimination, is through race-conscious reme-
dies. One would think that everyone would acknowledge that.
In 1971 the Supreme Court reviewed several cases involving
school desegregation.15 It looked at the issues that are being raised
anew by the Department of Justice, for example, the propriety of
race-conscious remedies for past discrimination. In one decision,
written by the Chief Justice, the Court said it is appropriate and,
indeed, necessary to consider race in devising a remedy where race
has been a factor in the constitutional violation.'6 How can we de-
Since 1844, when Macon B. Allen became the first black lawyer to be
admitted to the bar of any state, and since John S. Rock was admitted to
the bar of the United States Supreme Court on February 1, 1865, black
lawyers have litigated in the federal courts almost exclusively before
white judges .... In fact, in the "good old days" before William H.
Hastie was appointed in 1949 to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, white litigants throughout America were able to argue
before a judiciary from the United States District Court to the United
States Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court without
encountering a single black judge along the entire judicial route; for until
Judge Hastie's appointment there were no black Article HI judges. In
fact, until 1961. . .no President had ever appointed a black as a United
States District Court judge.
G. WmAw, FROM THE BLACK BAR. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK AMERICA, 68-9
(1976).
Judge Higginbotham presented these remarks in reply to several defendants'
motion that the judge be disqualified because he was black, the defendants white,
and the matter being one of racial discrimination. Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia v. Local Union No. 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F.
Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
14. See, e.g., State v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67, 47 S.E.2d 537 (1948) (overturning
superior court's refusal to quash bill of indictment where names were printed on
the list of prospective jurors in black ink if white, and red ink if non-white, and
no black person had ever served on a grand jury in the county).
15. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33
(1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); N.C. State Board of Education v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
16. "Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether
a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formu-
lating a remedy. To forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race
would deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment
1985]
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segregate schools or devise remedies to compensate for the exclu-
sion of minorities from various jobs unless we consider race? Oth-
erwise, there is no remedy.
Members of Congress, members of the judiciary know this.
Yet, we have a bill that has been introduced by United States Sen-
ator Orin Hatch that states there is a need to look forward; it calls
for us to forget about the past.1 7 Let us assume that everything is
equal and consider how we go forward from here-to go forward
from today, without benefit of constitutional remedies. The exclu-
sion of minorities and women from various jobs and opportunities
would continue-just as it had in the past-unless we have race-
and sex-conscious remedies. Equally troubling is that some courts
have begun to look with favor on the argument that race should
not be a factor in devising a remedy even for a proven constitu-
tional violation.
Nevertheless, in every case but one18 in which the Justice De-
partment is attacking affirmative action based on the ruling in
Stotts,"9 the courts have rejected the government's argument.
Courts have pointed out that the decision in Stotts is limited.
They have said that race-conscious remedies are necessary, and
that race will continue to be used. 0 Other cases are making their
way up to the Supreme Court and we will see how the Court rules
on them.2 1 If the Court accepts the Justice'Department's argu-
of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems." N.C.
State Board of Education, 402 U.S. at 46.
17. S. 37, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rac. 5128-34 (1985).
18. United States v. City of Cincinnati, 771 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1985).
19. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576.
20. "Defendants argue that Stotts eliminates all race-conscious relief except
that benefitting specifically identified victims of past discrimination. We do not
accept defendants' expansive interpretation of that opinion." EEOC v. Local 638
of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, 753 F.2d 1172, 1185 (2d
Cir. 1985). See also Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (D.D.C. 1985);
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 749 F.2d 102, 103 (1st Cir. 1984); Deveraux
v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1985); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1230-31 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Thomas v. City of
Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422, 435 (N.D. IM. 1985); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City
of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 486 (6th Cir. 1985).
21. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland,
753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); EEOC v. Local 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers' Intl. Assn., 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58
(1985).
[Vol. 8:29
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ment, if the Court accepts what Senator Hatch is proposing in his
bill,22 if the Court accepts what the Justice Department is propos-
ing in the Norfolk School case, namely that school districts can
return to "neighborhood" schools, 3 then we are turning back the
clock-back to where it was before Brown v. Board of Education.4
What I have said about employment, affirmative action, and
minority set-asides applies to criminal law enforcement. I will not
belabor the statistics about the disproportionate number of minor-
ities in penal institutions, 25 or about the way capital punishment is
imposed in this country.26 The Legal Defense Fund publishes a
document every few months about the death-row population in the
United States. With only one exception, death penalties have been
imposed in the past five years in this country solely in states of the
former southern confederacy. 2 Death penalties in this country in
22. See supra note 17.
23. Bell v. School Board of Norfolk, 734 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1984).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). When Minnie Jean Brown, a six year old black child,
sought admission to her predominantly white neighborhood school in Topeka,
Kansas, and was refused, her parents brought suit on equal protection grounds
against the school board. The school board contended that while schools were
segregated, their facilities were equal with relation to buildings, teacher salaries,
curriculum, and other measurable attributes. The Supreme Court squarely con-
fronted the question of whether segregation, even with completely equal facilities
provided, was contrary to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren held that the mere act of sep-
aration on a racial basis was impermissible:
[11n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. There-
fore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated ... are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
347 U.S. at 495.
25. According to U.S. Department of Justice figures, as of December 31, 1983,
46% of the prison population in the United States was black whereas blacks com-
prise 12% of the total U.S. population at large. For every 100,000 black males,
1445 are imprisoned compared to 225 white males per 100,000. In the South, 53%
of the prison population is black, with blacks comprising 19% of the population
at large. In North Carolina, 56% of the prison population are minorities. These
statistics have remained essentially unchanged since 1978. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on De-
cember 31, 1983, 7, Fig. 12 (Aug. 1984).
26. As of March 1, 1985, there are 1479 inmates on death row. Of those, 619
are black (41.85%), 84 are Hispanic (5.68%), 18 are Native American (1.22%) and
5 are Asian (0.34%). Death Row, U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCA-
TIONAL FUND, INC. (March 1, 1985).
27. Of the 38 persons executed from 1980 to April 1985, only one, Steven
1985]
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the past five years-and before-have been imposed in a clearly
racially discriminatory manner.
Those of you who read capital punishment cases in criminal
law should look at the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in McClesky28 which rejected an argument that capital punishment
in Georgia was being imposed in a racially discriminatory man-
ner. 2 We are bringing that case up to the Supreme Court. I think
that the evidence in McClesky clearly establishes the discrimina-
tory application of the death penalty in Georgia. 0 But, that is only
one indication of how criminal justice has been administered; only
Judy (Indiana), was executed outside of the southern states. Florida has executed
11 persons, Louisiana-7, Georgia-6, Texas-6, Virginia-2, North Carolina-2,
Alabama-I, Mississippi-i, and South Carolina-1. Death Row, U.S.A., supra
note 26, at 3.
28. McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146, cert denied, 449 U.S. 891
(1980), appealed sub nom. McClesky v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093, habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), reversed, en bane., 753 F.2d 877 (11th
Cir. 1985).
29. Both the district court and court of appeals focused on a study by Profes-
sor David C. Baldus, a comprehensive and exhaustive attempt to model factors
contributing to the imposition of the death penalty in the State of Georgia. Pro-
fessor Baldus conducted two surveys of offenders between 1973 and 1978, the first
measuring all persons convicted of murder and the second sampling those con-
victed of murder or voluntary manslaughter. The study measured as many as 500
variables.
The district court, for a number of reasons including questions concerning
the validity of various assumptions and methodologies employed by the research-
ers, found that the statistical evidence was insufficient to support the claim of
unconstitutionality in the death sentencing process in Georgia. The court of ap-
peals affirmed on this point, admitting that while the capital justice system is not
perfect, it need not be perfect in order to be constitutional. 753 F.2d at 887-99.
30. Judge Clark, in his dissent, viewed the Baldus study as demonstrating
that "[o]ne can only conclude that in the operation of this system the life of a
white is dearer, the life of a black cheaper." 753 F.2d at 920 (Clark, dissenting).
Judge Clark looked not at the racial disparity based upon the race of the defend-
ant, but rather upon the race of the victim. "These figures show a gross disparate
racial impact-that where the victim was white there were 11% death sentences,
compared to only 1.3 percent death sentences when the victim was black. Simi-
larly, only 8% of white defendants compared to 22% of black defendants received
the death penalty when the victim was white." Id. at 920.
In a recent study by the Dallas Times Herald, results indicated that people
who murder whites are prosecuted more frequently and are being put to death at
11 times the rate of those who kill blacks. In states where death penalty has been
imposed, a killer of a white has one chance in nine of a death sentence, while a
killer of a black has one chance in 20. Dallas Times Herald (Sunday, Nov. 17,
1985).
[Vol. 8:29
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one indication of how minorities have perceived-I think cor-
rectly-the way that criminal law has been imposed. And therein is
the dilemma.
Let me talk about minority perceptions of the criminal justice
system. In major urban areas in this country, every black group
with whom I have spoken puts drugs as the major problem affect-
ing the community. Yet many people are afraid, despite the
problems caused by drugs in their community, to talk about the
problems because of the disdain in which they hold the criminal
justice system.
For one thing, there is the question of judges. As Mr. Reagan
begins to appoint judges to the courts, it is incumbent on him to
worry about the fact that only two blacks are included among one
hundred forty-six persons he has appointed to the federal judici-
ary. Today, there are another one hundred and five vacancies.,3 I
am sure he appreciates the need for the court to at least appear
fair to those who are going to be affected by its decisions.
Another problem that troubles me is the decreasing number of
lawyers who can afford to become involved in public interest, civil
rights and civil liberties work. I am concerned about the lack of
commitment or interest among young lawyers. One reason I was
glad to speak at Campbell was the opportunity to make a plea for
you to consider becoming involved in this kind of work, though I
assure you that it is not an easy task. Let me give you an example.
When 1 began practicing law several years ago, financial assis-
tance from a foundation that thought it was important to help mi-
norities practice civil rights law in the South enabled me to estab-
lish an interracial law firm in North Carolina. The Legal Defense
Fund originated and operated the program for eight years-then it
could no longer fund the program. People thought there were
enough lawyers in the South willing to take on these cases. Do you
know how many minority lawyers we have in this country? Less
than six percent.32 Do you know how many are involved in this
kind of work? Less than one percent and the number is decreasing.
Do you know why? They cannot earn enough to survive in this
kind of work.
31. See Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appoint-
ments, JUDICATURE 313 (Apr.-May 1985).
32. According to the January 1984 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Earnings, of the 651,000 practicing lawyers and judges in the
United States, only 2.7% are black and 1.0% are Hispanic.
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I have traveled through thirteen southern states and I have
talked to a number of lawyers, black and white. They simply can-
not afford to take on civil rights cases; their clients cannot afford
to bring them. It is an interesting phenomenon. We have a 1964
Civil Rights Act"3 that says thou shall not discriminate in employ-
ment. But who can afford to exercise his or her rights under the
Act? Do you know what it costs to litigate an employment discrim-
ination case? You used to be able to litigate one for less than five
thousand dollars. Today, you would do well to litigate one for less
than fifty thousand dollars. In fact, if you are bold enough to bring
a class action, you would do well to litigate it for less than a half-
million dollars. Do you know any clients who can afford that? How
do you get paid? Well, if you win, eventually you get paid .3 How-
ever, the Department of Justice and the Association of Attorneys
General are now advocating that you ought not be paid any more
than seventy-five dollars an hour. 5 Consider the mathematics: You
bring a case in 1985. If it is a typical employment discrimination
case, you may get it resolved in 1990 or the year 2000-if you're
lucky. Five, maybe ten years later you will be paid at the rate of
seventy-five dollars an hour-very few lawyers can survive under
those conditions. Understandably, lawyers flee from practicing in
this area.
It is distressing to count the number of minority law firms,
and the number of minorities in law firms. It was 1969 before a
black became a partner in a major law firm in New York.30 It was
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982).
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides: "In any action or pro-
ceeding under this title [42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.] the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
35. United States Deputy Attorney General Carol E. Dinkens, for example,
spoke before the Senate's Subcommittee on the Judiciary in favor of Senate Bill
2802. The bill would amend the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(d)(1)
and (2) and modify all federal statutes, such as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. (1982) and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982),
that authorize awards of attorneys' fees against federal, state and local govern-
ments. The bill sets a maximum rate of 75 dollars per hour and specifically pre-
cludes the use of multipliers or bonuses to augment any awards. Statement of
Carol E. Dinkens, Deputy Attorney General before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, concerning S. 2802, The
Legal Fees Equity Act, Sept. 11, 1984.
36. Amalya Kerse, currently a judge of the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, was named as a partner of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed in 1969. See gener-
[Vol. 8:29
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/2
RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE 1980's
five more years before the second black became a partner. Two
months ago, I met with blacks who were partners in major law
firms in New York. There are now ten. And that is New York, a
liberal city. Do you know how many blacks are partners in major
white law firms in North Carolina? Or South Carolina? Or Chi-
cago? A handful. The problem is so acute that even the American
Bar Association, a bastion of moderation, got disturbed.", Blacks in
the law are being limited, not because of their skill, but because
they are black.
Every time I hear someone tell me otherwise-that the lack of
minorities is due to a lack of black lawyers with marketable
skills-I tell them about my experience. I practiced in North Caro-
lina. I graduated from Chapel Hill. Did I get a job offer? I went to
Columbia Law School for a masters degree. Frank Thomas, who is
now president of the Ford Foundation, finished Columbia Law
School at the same time. Did he get a job on Wall Street? He could
not get a job in New York. I could not get a job in North Caro-
lina.38 We couldn't get those jobs solely because we were black.
Why isn't the Attorney General talking about that problem? How
can we forget about these issues and be told to look to the future
when these problems remain? It is imperative that you consider
entering civil rights and civil liberties litigation: I think our coun-
try's future depends on it.
Today, at Columbia Law School, twenty-five percent fewer
blacks are applying for admission than in past years. 9 At Harvard,
ally, Karmel, Why Blacks Still Haven't Made It, THE AmERcAN LAwYER 121
(March, 1984).
37. See, e.g., Silas, Minorities in Law, 71 A.B.A. J. 32 (April 1985).
38. Of historical note, in 1962, when the North Carolina Advisory Committee
on Civil Rights published its report, Equal Protection of the Laws in North Caro-
lina, it reported only 70 black attorneys in North Carolina, less than 2% of all
attorneys. Blacks comprised approximately 25% of the state's population at that
time. Until 1939, no law school in the state admitted blacks, at which time, North
Carolina College Law School (now North Carolina Central University School of
Law) was formed. In 1950, the University of North Carolina Law School at
Chapel Hill denied admission to a black applicant and was supported by the U.S.
District Court because the state had provided a separate law school for blacks.
Epps v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D.N.C. 1950). The Epps decision
was reversed one year later by McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949 (1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). As of 1962, no black had been admitted to the North
Carolina Bar Association, a voluntary association of attorneys.
39. See generally, Romero, An Assessment of Affirmative Action in Law
School Admissions after Fifteen Years: A Need for Recommitment, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 430 (1984).
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there are fifty percent fewer applications from black students.
What is happening? I was deeply discouraged, but then Jack
Greenberg 0 started a program at Columbia to place students in
public interest law jobs for the summer. At a meeting describing
the program, we had a packed audience-over three hundred stu-
dents showed up. That program is now placing sixty students for
the summer in places like South Africa, the Phillipines, India,
North Carolina, New York, and Washington. The program is over-
subscribed. So there is some interest, but not enough.
A third and final point. I litigated a particular case for many
years.41 It involved four hundred black employees with an employ-
ment discrimination claim. After a complete victory-a Supreme
Court decision, a very broad-reaching affirmative action plan, back
pay, and attorney fees-only one hundred of those four hundred
black employees ever moved up into better jobs. Was the problem
race? No, it was not. Three hundred black employees simply could
not qualify to move up. They lacked the skills and training. I liti-
gated another case involving housing discrimination. 42 I repre-
sented one individual, and again we won. But the majority of
blacks in that community still live in inadequate housing. Some
school districts are still segregated and cannot possibly be inte-
grated. I have looked at the educational programs within some of
these schools. What I saw were programs worse than those I had in
segregated schools prior to 1954. What is happening to black chil-
dren in the urban public schools of America is worse than-or at
least as bad as-what black children suffered in the South and
elsewhere before Brown v. Board of Education.3 Sixty-eight per-
cent of the black male students in New York drop out of school
and never get a high school diploma. As we look at the perform-
ance of black students on SAT scores, we see that students are not
being prepared to get into college-and the problem is getting
worse.
In closing, I want to mention a third challenge that faces us
today that is somewhat different. I think it is possible for us to
40. Jack Greenberg was Mr. Julius Chambers' predecessor as director-counsel
of the NAACP-LDF having served for 23 years. He is currently a professor of law
at Columbia University School of Law and established its International Human
Rights Summer Internship Program.
41. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42. American McKnight v. Romney, (M.D.N.C. 1967) (no docket number
available).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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demonstrate that economic discrimination, just like that by race
and sex, ought be proscribed by the equal protection clause. Some
have suggested that the better argument is that economic discrimi-
nation ought to be proscribed under the privileges and immunities
clause"' or that we ought to find protection in the ninth amend-
ment."3 Nevertheless, I think that within the Constitution there
are provisions that would allow one to begin to address that
problem.
Poverty among Americans, black and white, is increasing in
tremendous numbers.46 We do not yet have a court finding that
provides protection from discrimination against the poor. I think it
is possible to look at this as a racial matter.47 Or, as I have dis-
cussed with the president of the National Organization of Women
44. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend 14, § 1.
45. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend 9.
46. The U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports series P-60, No.
144 (1983) reports the following poverty trends among Americans:
Below Poverty Level Below 125% of poverty level
1969 1979 1981 1982 1969 1979 1981 1982
(in millions)
All persons 24.1 26.1 31.8 34.4 34.7 36.6 43.7 46.5
White 16.7 17.2 21.6 23.5 24.5 25.2 31.0 33.1
Black 7.1 8.1 9.2 9.7 9.5 10.3 11.4 11.9
FHH, NHP* 10.4 13.5 15.7 16.3 13.0 17.4 19.8 20.3
(in percentage of population)
All persons 12.1 11.7 14.0 15.0 17.4 16.4 19.3 20.3
White 9.5 9.0 11.1 12.0 14.0 13.1 15.9 16.9
Black 32.2 31.0 34.2 35.6 43.2 39.9 42.4 43.8
FHH, NHP* 38.4 32.0 35.2 36.2 47.8 41.3 44.2 44.9
* FHH, NHP are families with a female head of household, no husband present.
Families and individuals are classified as being above or below the poverty
level using the poverty index originated at the Social Security Administration in
1964 and revised by the Federal Interagency Committee in 1969 and 1980. The
index is based solely on money income and does not reflect food stamps, medi-
caid, public housing, or other non-cash benefits. The poverty thresholds are up-
dated yearly to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. The following are
representative threshold poverty levels in 1983: single individual: $5,061; two per-
sons, one household, under 65 years of age: $6,697; three persons: $7,938; four
persons: $10,178. The 125% poverty level, which encompasses those individual
and families on the borderline of acute poverty, is, for example, $6,326 for a single
individual. Current Population Report, Series P-60, No. 138.
47. Id. See especially black percentiles versus white percentiles as reflected in
the census data.
1985]
15
Chambers: Symposium Address: Racial Justice in the 1980s
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Legal Defense Fund,48 as a race-sex matter. 49 Somewhere in this
audience, in this law school, in the legal profession today, are those
who will begin to address the growing problem of the plight of the
poor, white and black, and to develop some legal means for provid-
ing some redress.
Consider this example. In one community in this country,
schools spend, on the average, a hundred and fifty dollars per stu-
dent per year, compared with an average of two thousand dollars
per student in another school district. Is that a violation of the
Constitution? Would you expect the student on whom a hundred
and fifty dollars is spent to be getting an education equal to that of
the student on whom two thousand dollars is spent? Is there a way
to challenge that? Or does San Antonio v. Rodriquez"0 provide the
48. Jackie Washington.
49. Id. See especially female head of household data as reflected in the cen-
sus data.
50. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court upheld a school funding scheme which pro-
vided that neighborhood school districts provide a substantial portion of the reve-
nue of local schools. The clear effect was that poor neighborhood children were
deprived of the educational benefits available to children of more affluent neigh-
borhoods. While the Court recognized the discriminatory effect of the scheme, it
refused to apply a strict level of scrutiny and analyzed the scheme merely in
terms of rationality.
Justice Marshall dissented. One of the elements of his dissent questioned the
failure of the majority to classify the deprived class as a "suspect class." "The
highly suspect character of classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage is
well established. The reasons why such classifications call for close judicial scru-
tiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recog-
nized as 'discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless to protect
their interests in the political process." Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting, cita-
tions omitted), citing U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938). Further, "[tihis Court has frequently recognized that discrimination on
the basis of wealth may create a classification of suspect character and thereby
call for exacting judicial scrutiny." Id. at 117, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
Justice Marshall pointed out that wealth classifications are distinguishable
from classifications of race, sex or alienage. Id. at 121. "The 'poor' may not be
seen as politically powerless as certain discrete and insular minority groups...
[and] . . . it cannot be ignored that social legislation must frequently take cogni-
zance of the economic status of our citizens." Id. at 121-22. "Thus," Justice Mar-
shall stated, "we have generally gauged the invidiousness of wealth classifications
with an awareness of the importance of the interests being affected." Id. at 122,
citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Justice Marshall concluded this portion of his dissent by holding that where
an individual school child was discriminated against as a result of that over which
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answer? Is there another way to interpret San Antonio v. Rodri-
quez? Would introducing race in San Antonio v. Rodriquez have
provided protection? It is a question you ought to ponder. Can the
privileges and immunities clause, or the ninth amendment, provide
a way to guarantee the right to equal education?
Those are some challenges that we are trying to address now
at the Legal Defense Fund. I think that the progress we make in
race relations in the years to come will depend on the success that
we have in evolving these legal principles-just as it did for the
civil rights lawyers in the 1940's who brought about the successful
challenge to Plessy v. Ferguson51 that culminated in the Brown
decision.
the individual has no control, namely group wealth as opposed to personal wealth,
and such discrimination is no reflection of the individual's characteristics or his
abilities, strict scrutiny is mandated. Id. at 123.
51. 163 U.S. 537.
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